征信

为探索个人征信机构市场准入的管理经验,2015年中国人民银行同意芝麻信用、腾讯征信等8家社会机构进行个人征信开业准备。然而,央行最终未向这8家机构单独发放牌照,而是在2018年对具有数据共享性质的百行征信颁发了牌照。利用博弈模型对百行征信成立的合理性进行理论分析,并对如何有效实现个人信息保护问题提出政策建议。研究发现,激励机制能够促成各机构达成合作,且增大惩罚力度可以提高接入机构保护个人信息的概率。

In order to explore the management experience of market access of individual credit reporting agencies, the People's Bank of China approved eight social institutions such as Sesame Credit and Tencent Credit to make preparation for the opening of personal credit reporting in 2015. However, in the end, the central bank did not issue a separate license to these eight institutions. Instead, it issued a license to Baihang Credit with the nature of data sharing in 2018. This paper makes a theoretical analysis of the rationality of the establishment of Baixing Credit by using the game model, and puts forward some policy suggestions on how to effectively protect personal information. The study has found that incentive mechanisms can facilitate cooperation among various institutions, and increasing penalties can increase the probability that access agencies protect personal information.